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Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism 
Guy Fletcher  
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to undermine a basic assumption of theories of well-
being, one that I call well-being invariabilism. I argue that much of what makes existing 
theories of well-being inadequate stems from the invariabilist assumption. After 
distinguishing and explaining well-being invariabilism and well-being variabilism, I show that 
the most widely-held theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and pluralist 
objective-list theories—presuppose invariabilism and that a large class of the objections to 
them arise because of it. My aim is to show that abandoning invariabilism and adopting 
variabilism is a sensible first step for those aiming to formulate more plausible theories of 
well-being. After considering objections to my argument, I explain what a variabilist theory 
of well-being would be like and show that well-being variabilism need not be any threat to the 
project of formulating theories of well-being that deliver general principles concerning 
well-being enhancement. 
1. Introduction 
Those of us who find the existing theories of well-being inadequate 
should trace much of their implausibility to a common feature of these 
theories: invariabilism. I begin by distinguishing and explaining two 
theses, well-being invariabilism and well-being variabilism. I show that the 
most widely-held theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfaction, 
and objective-list theories—presuppose invariabilism and that a large 
class of the objections to them arise because of it. I try to show that 
abandoning invariabilism and adopting variabilism is the first step in 
formulating more plausible theories of well-being. 
2. Invariabilism and well-being 
The first task is to lay out two theses about well-being. I call them well-
being invariabilism and well-being variabilism and they comprise the 
following claims: 
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22 Guy Fletcher 
Well-being invariabilism: Any X that non-instrumentally enhances well-
being in one context must enhance well-being in any other.1 
Well-being variabilism: Any X that non-instrumentally enhances well-
being in one context may fail to enhance well-being, or detract from 
well-being, in another context. 
Note that I say ‘enhances well-being’. This is deliberately vague. It is 
intended to ensure that I am not committed to any particular view of 
how well-being and value are related, or on the nature of well-being 
more generally.2 My aim in Sections 3-5 is to show that many existing 
theories of well-being rest upon well-being invariabilism and that much of 
what people have found inadequate about them can be traced back to 
this feature. If this is so, then we should reject this feature if we want to 
make progress in formulating plausible theories of well-being. I consider 
objections to my argument in Section 6 before showing what a variabilist 
theory of well-being would be like in Section 7. 
3. Hedonism 
First, let us consider hedonistic theories of well-being. We can find 
evidence of well-being invariabilism in contemporary forms of hedonism 
about well-being, such as those defended by Roger Crisp (2006: 100) and 
Fred Feldman (2004: 13). These forms of hedonism are explicitly about 
well-being, as revealed when they write, respectively: 
I wish to discuss hedonism as a theory of well-being, that is, of what is 
ultimately good for any individual. 
I want to know, in the abstract, what features make a life a good one for the 
one who lives it. 
                                                      
1 The theses concern non-instrumental well-being enhancement because no-one would 
wish to defend well-being invariabilism about instrumental well-being enhancers. It is more 
common to use ‘intrinsic’ where I have used ‘non-instrumental’ but because this is 
potentially misleading I follow Richard Kraut (2007: 6) in using the more inelegant term. 
2 It is tempting, however, to think that the popularity of invariabilist theories of value in 
general partly explains the popularity of invariabilist theories of well-being. 
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Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism 23 
More importantly, they rest upon well-being invariabilism. Crisp (2006: 
102) writes that: 
[W]e might define hedonism as the view that what is good for any individual 
is the enjoyable experiences in her life, what is bad is the suffering in that 
life, and the life best for an individual is that with the greatest balance of 
enjoyment over suffering. 
Crisp (2006:102) writes that this characterisation, which is the closest he 
comes to an explicit statement of the view he wishes to defend, ‘seems to 
me correct as far as it goes’. I take his comments to suggest a 
commitment to well-being invariabilism, even if it does not explicitly state 
it.  
Thankfully, Feldman’s ‘Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism’ theory of 
well-being explicitly commits itself to well-being invariabilism. Feldman 
(2004: 66) states this view thus: 
Every episode of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure is intrinsically good; every 
episode of intrinsic attitudinal pain is intrinsically bad. 
The intrinsic value of an episode of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure is equal 
to the amount of pleasure contained in that episode; the intrinsic value of an 
episode of intrinsic attitudinal pain is equal to—(the amount of pain 
contained in that episode). 
The intrinsic value of a life is entirely determined by the intrinsic values 
of the episodes of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure and pain contained in the life, 
in such a way that one life is intrinsically better than another if and only if the 
net amount of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in the one is greater than the net 
amount of that sort of pleasure in the other. 
This clearly rests upon well-being invariabilism.3  
Having shown that hedonist theories of well-being are invariabilist, I 
move on to the more important task of showing that many of the 
objections that philosophers have levelled at hedonism can be traced 
back to this feature.4 
                                                      
3 Feldman’s third thesis is another that many theories of well-being have presupposed—
additivism—and is the claim that the value of a life as a whole is a simple sum of the value of 
its parts. I remain neutral on additivism here. 
4 There are, of course, other objections to hedonism. My claim is that a large and 
significant class of objections to it can be traced back to this feature. 
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24 Guy Fletcher 
One long-standing objection to hedonism comes from considering 
malicious pleasures.5 The objection is often pressed against hedonism as a 
theory of value generally rather than about well-being in particular but 
Feldman (2004: 39) discusses it in the context of well-being also. He uses 
the example of a terrorist who sets off a bomb in a playground and takes 
great pleasure in the ensuing suffering. The objection to hedonism is 
that this pleasure does not make the terrorist’s life go any better (some 
would want to say it makes it worse), so hedonism is false. 
In response to this, Feldman (2004: 39) points out that the relevant 
scale of evaluation is what he calls ‘the evaluation of the life in itself, for 
the one who lives it’ (Italics in original). He argues that, if we focus on this 
scale of evaluation, hedonism can perhaps respond to the objection by 
saying that the life of the terrorist, ‘though disgraceful and morally 
indefensible, was not so terribly bad in itself for him.’ Whether we find 
such a response convincing is by-the-by. The important point is that the 
response nicely brings out the invariabilism at the heart of hedonism. 
A second long-standing objection to hedonism is the base pleasures 
objection. Feldman (2004: 40) uses the example of ‘Porky’, a person who 
spends his time in a pigsty gaining great pleasure from ‘the most 
obscene sexual practices imaginable.’6 Feldman claims that hedonism is 
committed to adjudging Porky’s life to be very good, and judges that this 
implication is disturbing.7 
A third perennial objection is that the hedonist must attribute 
positive value to false pleasures. We can see the false pleasures objection 
in the following thought-experiment, from Kagan (1994: 311). Imagine 
that H takes a large amount of pleasure in believing that he is a 
successful and respected family member and colleague where actually: 
his friends detest him, his wife cuckolds him, and his colleagues mock 
him in his absence. Hedonism must judge that, other things being equal, 
                                                      
5 For discussion of the objection against hedonism as a theory of value generally, see 
Fletcher (2008: 467-71). 
6 Feldman’s example is a modified version of one found in Moore (1903: 146). 
7 More specifically, ‘default hedonism’ in Feldman’s terminology. 
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Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism 25 
his life is better for the presence of these pleasures. The person wielding 
the objection will then likely claim that even if it is not going any worse 
for the presence of these pleasures, they do not make it any better.8 
Whilst these kinds of objections to hedonism are often deployed in 
unison, they are usually regarded as distinct. The more interesting point, 
though, is that we can trace all of them back to the invariabilism at the 
root of hedonism.9 Most critics of hedonism who wield the 
aforementioned objections agree that some pleasures have value, it is just 
that they do not think that all of the malicious, base and false ones do as 
well. Hedonism is vulnerable precisely because it claims that any pleasure 
enhances a person’s well-being. 
4. Desire-fulfilment theories 
Consider now desire-fulfilment theories of well-being. The most basic 
type—unrestricted desire-fulfilment theory—holds that what enhances 
someone’s well-being is the satisfaction of their actual desires. This is 
invariabilist and the resulting problem for unrestricted desire-fulfilment 
theory is that we often have desires that cannot plausibly be thought to 
contribute to well-being. The ubiquitous example from the literature is 
Parfit’s (1984: 494) stranger case. Suppose I meet an affable stranger 
and come to desire that they recover from their illness but never meet 
them again. The problem for unrestricted desire-fulfilment theory is 
seeing how the satisfaction of such a desire itself could plausibly be said 
to make my life go better. Similarly, as Griffin (1986: 10) points out, we 
often have preferences that are based on factual error, or a lack of 
knowledge, and unrestricted desire-fulfilment theory gives us the wrong 
answers in these cases also by holding that the satisfaction of such desires 
always contributes to well-being. 
                                                      
8 There are stronger forms of invariabilism that would entail that the level of well-being 
would be equal between this life and one in which the pleasures were based on true beliefs, 
other things being equal. I concentrate on the weaker forms of invariabilism that do not 
make the equal value claim in order to make my argument more general. 
9 Feldman (2004: 49-50) makes this point. 
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26 Guy Fletcher 
The same invariabilism can be located in other more sophisticated 
desire-fulfilment theories of well-being. For example, consider those 
theories that hold that what makes my life go better is the satisfaction 
of ideal-desires, where these are understood as desires which have gone 
through some sort of filtering, such as being free of factual or logical 
error, or being formed in conditions of full-information. Aside from 
any other problems with such a theory, there seem to be many desires 
that I would have in such circumstances the fulfilment of which would 
not plausibly contribute to my well-being, in addition to those that 
would.10 
5. Objective-list theories 
Finally, let us consider objective-list theories. These theories specify a 
certain list of goods that contribute to well-being in a manner 
independently of the agent’s attitude or preferences. Sometimes they 
also have a unifying rationale, as in some perfectionist theories, other 
times they do not. 
One difficulty here is that there are fewer examples of well-developed 
pluralist objective-list theories than of the other two types of theory I have 
examined.11 This means that part of my target here is the sort of objective-
list theory that many people appear to hold, even if they do not devote 
much time to formulating it.12 Typically, objective-list theories have at 
least these four entries on the list: pleasure, knowledge, autonomy and 
friendship. I will let this serve as my candidate objective-list theory. 
Two corollaries of the lack of development of objective-list theories 
are that there is less textual evidence for their invariabilism and fewer 
long-standing objections. Nevertheless, I take such theories to 
presuppose the invariabilist thesis. One articulation of the invariabilism I 
                                                      
10 See Griffin (1986: 17). 
11 Finnis (1980) is one of the few examples of a worked-out and defended objective list 
theory. 
12 See, for instance, Hooker (2000: 43) who identifies himself as holding an objective list 
theory though he does not spend time formulating it (for perfectly legitimate reasons). 
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Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism 27 
take to be inherent in such theories appears in Griffin (1986: 54) when 
he writes the following: 
So the most plausible form of objectivism allows that many values—many more 
than the ones linked to basic needs—are objective. The thought behind 
forming them into a standard of well-being would be this: when they appear in a 
person’s life, then whatever his tastes, attitudes, or interests, his life is better. (My italics). 
I take this to be representative of the rationale underlying objective list 
theories and their commitment to well-being invariabilism.  
A second example comes from Finnis (1980: 72) when, in discussing 
knowledge, he writes: 
It is obvious that a man who is well-informed, etc., simply is better-off (other 
things being equal) than a man who is muddled, deluded, and ignorant, that 
the state of the one is better than the state of the other, not just in this 
particular case or that, but in all cases, as such, universally, and whether I like it 
or not. (Italics in original).  
Although Finnis only explicitly compares the well-informed man and the 
deluded man—as opposed to the well-informed man and the 
marginally-better-informed man—the rest of the passage, and his 
discussion in general, is strongly invariabilist. 
The problem for objective-list theories is that their typical contents 
do not seem to contribute to well-being in an invariable fashion. For 
example, any objective-list theory that includes pleasure faces the same 
problems faced by hedonism—that of trying to account for those 
instances of pleasure that do not seem to enhance well-being. 
A second problem is that an objective-list theory that identifies 
knowledge as something that contributes to well-being will face a similar 
objection—that there are many instances of knowledge that look like 
they do not contribute to a person’s well-being. For example, imagine 
two people—A and B—who have led previously identical lives that are 
solitary and filled with pain and misery. Imagine that, shortly before 
they both die, a well-meaning person places a note in the cell of A on 
which is written ‘Gorillas cannot swim’ and that A thereby comes to know 
that gorillas cannot swim. 
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28 Guy Fletcher 
To keep things simple, we need to imagine that A has no particular 
aversion to knowing about gorillas but neither was it something that he 
(or B) wanted to discover, nor does he experience pleasure from 
acquiring the knowledge. Assuming that possessing such knowledge does 
not cause a reduction in one of the other objective-list goods, the 
objective-list theorist who includes knowledge on their list must conclude 
that A is made better off than B by the acquisition of this knowledge. 
This implication seems to cast doubt upon those objective list theories 
that claim that knowledge always contributes to well-being. 
Of course, as Finnis (1980: 62) points out, holding that knowledge 
invariably contributes to well-being does not entail that every 
proposition is equally worth knowing or that knowledge of any particular 
proposition would be equally valuable for each person. But it does mean 
that in any case where a person acquires more knowledge—no matter 
what it is knowledge of—it will be of some benefit to them (other things 
equal), even if only a very small one. And even this weaker claim seems 
implausible. 
For the sake of brevity and clarity, I frame the rest of the discussion 
using just objective-list theories. This is for three reasons. First, one 
should properly regard hedonism as an objective-list theory, albeit with 
an unusually short list. Second, the correct theory of well-being will be an 
objective-list theory. Third, everything that I say could also be applied, 
with the necessary changes, to desire-fulfilment theories. 
6. Objection 
I will now address an objection to my attempt to undermine 
invariabilism in the theory of well-being. An objector might claim that 
the examples I have used are disingenuous. Before proceeding then, let 
us be reminded of the sorts of examples I have cited.  
In the case of pleasure, there do seem to be many cases in which 
pleasure contributes to someone’s well-being. Yet, there also seem to be 
situations, such as the deluded businessman case, where it does not. In a 
similar vein, consider instances of knowledge. It seems plausible to think 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
 at
 07
:41
 24
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism 29 
that sometimes knowledge can enhance well-being. Other times, though, 
it seems likely that it will have no effect. Examples of this might be the 
knowledge that gorillas cannot swim, or of the number of black pens in 
the Pentagon.13 
An obvious move for the invariabilist to make here is to try and refine 
the atoms of well-being in order to head off these objections. They might 
claim that the examples that I have cited against well-being invariabilism 
only work because I have used particularly unsuitable candidates.14 In 
response to the cases mentioned above, they might claim that the correct 
well-being enhancers, rather than being things like pleasure or 
knowledge, are actually more like the following:15 
(a)  pleasure that is not based on a false belief. 
(b)  knowledge of important truths. 
My responses to this are threefold. First, especially for refinements such 
as (b), there will be the question of whether atoms refined in this fashion 
can be independently specified. The person who points to a feature such 
as (b) needs to be able to provide an account of important truths that 
does not come out as ‘the sort that contributes to well-being’. I do not 
claim that they cannot do so, but it is something lurking in the 
background for those who wish to pursue this strategy. Nevertheless, I 
will assume that such specification is always forthcoming, as there are 
other problems to address. 
A more important point is that this refinement strategy blurs an 
important distinction between (a) the thing that contributes to well-being 
                                                      
13 When discussing the value of knowledge (generally, not in relation to well-being) Ross 
(1930: 139) mentions the apparent worthlessness of what he calls ‘mere matters of fact’ 
such as the number of stories in a building. He writes: ‘But on reflection it seems clear that 
even about matters of fact right opinion is in itself a better state of mind to be in than 
wrong, and knowledge than right opinion.’ 
14 Although, of course, these are exactly the sorts of candidates objective-list theorists have 
tended to include on their lists. 
15 The first of these is based on Feldman’s (2004: 112) ‘Truth-Adjusted Intrinsic 
Attitudinal Hedonism’. 
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30 Guy Fletcher 
in a particular context and (b) the background conditions that can affect 
whether it does so.16 In the case of the pleasure not based on false belief, 
the fact that it is not based on a false belief seems better conceived as 
part of the background conditions that can affect whether the pleasure is 
well-being enhancing, rather than as a part of the well-being enhancer 
itself.  
Even if the invariabilist is unconvinced that the refinement strategy 
blurs a genuine distinction between a well-being enhancing feature and 
the background conditions that affect whether it contributes to well-
being, there is a third problem for the strategy. This is that we will find 
that the same considerations which undermined the purported 
invariability of our original atoms can undermine the new refined atoms 
(a) and (b). Contra (a), we can think of cases in which pleasure based on 
false belief does make someone’s life go better. For example, there are 
many times in which one takes pleasure in the belief that one has solved 
a philosophical problem or is listening to someone else doing so. It is 
clear that at least some of these pleasures are good for their experiencer, 
even where the person is mistaken in so believing. 
Against (b), it is difficult to see how even knowledge of important 
truths always contributes to well-being. Whatever one uses as a candidate 
for (b), the proof of Fermat’s last theorem, the knowledge of how the 
universe began, or whether there is intelligent life elsewhere within it—it 
does not seem plausible to think that the possession of such knowledge 
by a person must make that person’s life go better. If it were so then the 
possession of such knowledge would make the life of anyone go better as 
long as it did not cause a reduction in any of the other objective-list 
goods of the same or greater amount. But this does not seem to be true 
in the case of incredibly destitute people. And the same is true of many 
people who have led good lives. It just is not clear that even these more 
specific classes of knowledge will always contribute to well-being 
regardless of whatever else is the case.  
                                                      
16 A similar distinction between reasons and enablers is argued for by Dancy (2004). 
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Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism 31 
The particular refinements I have discussed here are not important, 
as they are only supposed to be representative of the strategy of 
specifying more complex contributors to well-being in the hope of 
making invariabilism more plausible. As such, undermining (a) and (b) 
in particular is a small victory and is only supposed to suggest the type of 
problems that will arise for such specifications. An important point is 
that even if one does think, for example, that important knowledge 
always contributes to well-being, there is still the further issue of what 
else is on the objective list, and whether it too can plausibly be regarded 
as invariable. Furthermore, even if one thinks that the refinement 
strategy will succeed in homing in on a range of invariable contributors 
to well-being, we still have the interesting result that many of the 
existing theories of well-being are inadequate and need reformulation in 
terms of more specific well-being contributors. 
In light of the problems outlined above, I think that we have reason 
to believe that the refinement strategy will not rescue invariabilism. It 
can perhaps survive the demand for independent specification of the 
refined atoms but I do not think it can avoid both of the other 
objections. The first was that the strategy fuses elements that seem better 
kept apart: the well-being enhancing feature and the background 
conditions. The second was that it seemed doubtful whether even such 
refined atoms would exhibit invariability. 
7. What a variabilist theory of well-being could be 
Someone who has doubts about invariabilism might nevertheless worry 
that to allow variabilism at the base of a theory of well-being would be to 
abandon the theory of well-being altogether. My aim now is to show that 
this is not so by showing that a variabilist theory of well-being is perfectly 
consistent with the existence of general principles governing well-
being.17 
                                                      
17 I thank anonymous referees for encouraging me to say more about what well-being 
variabilism would be like and for suggesting the objection that variabilist theories could not 
recognise general truths about well-being enhancement. 
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32 Guy Fletcher 
The difference between a variabilist and an invariabilist theory of 
well-being is shown in their answer to the second of two questions about 
well-being. The first is: ‘which things are capable of being well-being 
enhancing?’ The second is: ‘when will they be so?’ Holders of the kinds 
of invariabilist positions considered above have tended to assume that 
the answer to the second question is ‘always’. A variabilist will suggest 
that the answer to the second question is not ‘always’ but rather ‘under 
certain circumstances’. A variabilist objective-list theory therefore 
distinguishes two tasks. The first is to specify the things that are capable 
of enhancing well-being. The second task is to discover when these things 
are well-being enhancing (on the assumption that at least one of the 
items on the list is variable). And there is nothing in the variabilist 
position as such that rules out the possibility of there being simple 
principles that govern when they are. 
For example, consider the following theory (chosen for simplicity 
alone). One could hold an objective list theory that claims that only 
pleasure is capable of being well-being enhancing and that there are only 
three factors that can prevent it from being so: its being based on a false 
belief, its arising in the course of doing something base, or its being 
malicious. This is a variabilist theory that is perfectly compatible with 
general truths about well-being enhancement. Of course, it is an 
implausible and artificial theory but it nonetheless serves to show that 
there need not be anything mysterious about a variabilist theory of well-
being. 
Those who are inclined towards invariabilism will likely seek to 
rewrite this theory of well-being, such that it has only one well-being 
enhancer, which is invariable.This brings us back to the objections above, 
especially the objection that this move distorts things by combining 
elements that have a different status—namely the thing that is well-being 
enhancing and factors that can affect whether it is so.18 And in the 
absence of a reason for thinking that well-being must function invariably 
                                                      
18 Section 6. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
 at
 07
:41
 24
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism 33 
it is difficult to see the motivation for doing so. My alternative proposal 
is for well-being theorists to recast their theories as accounts of the only 
things that are capable of enhancing well-being and to investigate 
separately the question of when they do so. 
8. Conclusion 
I have shown that many of the existing theories of well-being are 
invariabilist. I have also shown that much of what we find implausible 
about them stems from the presence of this feature. I then claimed that 
there is room to doubt whether specifying the well-being contributors in 
a more detailed way will make invariabilism more plausible. As such, I 
think that we should see whether we are able to formulate more plausible 
theories of well-being by rejecting invariabilism and adopting 
variabilism.19 
University of Reading 
guyfletcher16@gmail.com 
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